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Abstract
I would like to summarize five key areas of risk the government donor of the concession,
financial institutions, or other types of project sponsors are exposed to and the contractors involved,
which means the groups who are designing, delivering, and putting into operation those plants and
installations for periods generally expected to be twenty, thirty, or thirty-five years. These five risk
categories are: first, that the project has to be completed in time, within budget, and has to be kept
in operation; second, that the project must generate the cash flow required for the debt service
and the return on investment on the equity put in by the sponsors; third, the currency fluctuation;
fourth, the erosion affecting the political environment; fifth, the general economic conditions that
nobody really has control over.
THE CONTRACTOR'S VIEW
Dr. Martin Heubel*
Dr. Nagla Nassar has very nicely and carefully explained the
government's interest, and I share with her the approach that we
are not talking about the European environment. I would like
to share some views with you in order to explain the concerns of
a sponsor or a contractor from experiences I have in getting
projects off the ground involving waste incineration in Greece
and Brazil and a coal-fired power station in Mexico. I would like
to preface that with the notion that monopoly situations for a
group of sponsors, a group of contractors, or one contractor and
one operator are scarcer than is considered. There is always in-
ternational competition for these famous build-own-operate
("BOO") projects.
I would like to summarize five key areas of risk the govern-
ment donor of the concession, financial institutions, or other
type of project sponsor are exposed to and the contractors in-
volved, which means the groups who are designing, delivering,
and putting into operation those plants and installations for pe-
riods generally expected to be twenty, thirty, or thirty-five years.
These five risk categories are:
* first, that the project has to be completed in time, within
budgets, and has to be kept in operation,
* second, that the project must generate the cash flow re-
quired for the debt service and the return on investment
on the equity put in by the sponsors,
* third, the currency fluctuation,
" fourth, the erosion affecting the political environment,
* fifth, the general economic conditions that nobody really
has control over.
If you would compare what the analysts and experts told us
about two years ago about the tiger states to what they would say
now, they just have forgotten whatever they said.
Thus, sponsors and, specifically, contractors involved face a
far more challenging task than what normally occurs when bid-
ding for a major construction project on a turn-key lump sum
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price. Although behaving in a rather fragile environment, you
must assure yourself and the financing groups that the quality of
the product or the service remains stable. Also, the supply and
the price of all commodities or utilities that are required need to
be dependable. The cash to be generated out of the service
fees-for example, the service fee to clean up, to treat one ton
of waste, or to process one cubic meter of waste water-flows at
planned levels for the total pay-back period. All this cost has to
be reasonably preestimated for a period of normally three to five
years of construction and then from the date when the plant
starts to produce or delivers service, for a period of twenty-five
years. The long-term dependability of all factors is essential. I
can imagine that we have many participants in this symposium
who are all in favor of deregulation and privatization. The real
world very often favors a more stable environment, which is why
we do not have too much competition. The existing regulations
are dependable and accountable for the lifetime of a specific
project because, otherwise, nobody will support the financial
and economical viability of a project.
Considering some of the observations Dr. Nassar already
made, I will just refresh your memory: normally a BOO project
entails a series of contracts. The most important contract is the
concession. Generally, the concession is issued to a group of
sponsors wherein the suppliers of the plant participate. Certain
mandatory topics need to be cleared with the concession agree-
ment. You can reduce the important topics to the dependability
of cash flow and operation of the plant continuously over the
lifetime at the planned and budgeted performance levels. Both
of these topics are embodied into a long-term monopoly in the
region for the service desired.
The sponsors will establish a legal entity that will be the
partner to the public agency or body extending such concession.
They will sign shareholders' agreements and articles of associa-
tions. In the shareholders' agreements, they must be very care-
ful about how voting rights are established and what the ground
rules are. The most essential ground rule is to keep the increase
of debt or additional equity on a strictly voluntary basis. The
concessioneel then signs two contracts: one contract with the
1. The public unit is the concessionaire. The build-own-operate group is the con-
cessionee.
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supplier of the plant, such as the waste incineration plant or the
power plant; the other contract with the unit or the partners out
of the total sponsoring group who are operating that plant for a
longer period of time.
Deregulation or privatization tends to jeopardize cash flow.
When the donor of the concession decides to privatize a portion
of that service, the concessionee is supposed to make it consis-
tent with another unit in the same region. There emerges a
competitor for waste. 2 The offers for price, the service charge,
and the competing privatized unit are all different. Conse-
quently, the expectation of cash flow to be generated over the
lifetime of that plant cannot be supported anymore.
The way one is normally done-and you were very right in
outlining the conflicts-is that the sponsoring group, with sup-
port of the financial institutions, is to insist on what you would
call a deliver-or-pay obligation. Given a "deliver waste" or "pay
money" obligation, the concessionee can count on the constant
stream of cash needed to service the debt under the financing
arrangements. If a situation for technical day-to-day or political
reasons is such that the concessionaire cannot supply or prevents
the collection of waste or establishes another waste policy, then
that whole project can no longer be financed. The consequence
is that these sponsors resort to the ultimate remedy, which is to
trigger a buyout event for default of the concessionaire. You can
assume and imagine what lengthy discussions it takes to negoti-
ate a buyout clause because you must determine estimates for
the various situations where that buyout situation may occur.
Dr. Nassar addressed the interest of the government to
maintain stable tariffs. Certainly that is an understandable ap-
proach for economical and political reasons. Also, the investor
or the sponsoring group is interested in keeping tariffs stable
because we often have a very difficult negotiating session when it
comes to the issue of a government wanting to preserve the right
to change the tariff. If political or economical problems exist,
then they would like to decrease the tariff.
In some areas, it may even be difficult to collect the service
fees from all the users because if waste disposal gets too expen-
sive, then people throw it out in the woods or into the desert.
2. You all know that we have a lot of competition in Germany and in Europe to get
enough waste to fire all of our incineration plants.
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Alternatively, if waste water gets too expensive, then people dis-
charge waste water by other means than through the public
draining and sewage system. So normally in a situation like this,
it very often helps to insert certain contingencies into the cost
estimate or to apply certain percentages to cover an increase and
to limit the decrease of the tariffs. This result has to be accepted
by the financing institutions and that is sometimes not easy.
To sum up my observations, I would like to advise this hon-
orable academic community that the fear of governments in
emerging countries that they will be abused by powerful spon-
sors and contractors is overemphasized for understandable ne-
gotiating reasons. In fact, we do have competition in this indus-
try as evidenced by the fact that we have nine major competitors
for our Brazilian projects. Thank you.
